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First DialoguePart III
Part III
Hyl. It is just come into my head, Philonous, that I have somewhere heard
of a distinction between absolute and sensible extension. Now, though it be
acknowledged that great and small, consisting merely in the relation which
other extended beings have to the parts of our own bodies, do not really
inhere in the substances themselves; yet nothing obliges us to hold the same
with regard to absolute extension, which is something abstracted from great
and small, from this or that particular magnitude or figure. So likewise as to
motion; swift and slow are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in
our own minds. But, it doth not follow, because those modifications of motion
exist not without the mind, that therefore absolute motion abstracted from
them doth not.
Phil. Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or one part of
extension, from another? Is it not something sensible, as some degree of
swiftness or slowness, some certain magnitude or figure peculiar to each?
Hyl. I think so.
Phil. These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible properties,
are without all specific and numerical differences, as the schools call them.
Hyl. They are.
Phil. That is to say, they are extension in general, and motion in
general.
Hyl. Let it be so.
Phil. But it is a universally received maxim that Everything which exists
is particular. How then can motion in general, or extension in general, exist
in any corporeal substance?
Hyl. I will take time to solve your difficulty.
Phil. But I think the point may be speedily decided. Without doubt you
can tell whether you are able to frame this or that idea. Now I am content to
put our dispute on this issue. If you can frame in your thoughts a distinct
abstract idea of motion or extension, divested of all those sensible modes, as
swift and slow, great and small, round and square, and the like, which are
acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point you
contend for. But if you cannot, it will be unreasonable on your side to insist
any longer upon what you have no notion of.
Hyl. To confess ingenuously, I cannot.
Phil. Can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion from the
ideas of all those qualities which they who make the distinction term
secondary?
Hyl. What! is it not an easy matter to consider extension and motion by
themselves, abstracted from all other sensible qualities? Pray how do the
mathematicians treat of them?
Phil. I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general
propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without mentioning any
other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat of them abstractedly. But, how
doth it follow that, because I can pronounce the word motion by itself, I can
form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body? or, because theorems may be
made of extension and figures, without any mention of great or small, or any
other sensible mode or quality, that therefore it is possible such an abstract
idea of extension, without any particular size or figure, or sensible
quality^2, should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the mind?
Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regarding what other sensible
qualities it is attended with, as being altogether indifferent to their
demonstrations. But, when laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare
ideas, I believe you will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas of
extension.
[Footnote 2: "Size or figure, or sensible quality" - "size, colour, &c," in
the first and second editions.]
Hyl. But what say you to pure intellect? May not abstracted ideas be
framed by that faculty?
Phil. Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is plain I cannot
frame them by the help of pure intellect; whatsoever faculty you understand
by those words. Besides, not to inquire into the nature of pure intellect and
its spiritual objects, as virtue, reason, God, or the like, thus much seems
manifest - that sensible things are only to be perceived by sense, or
represented by the imagination. Figures, therefore, and extension, being
originally perceived by sense, do not belong to pure intellect: but, for
your farther satisfaction, try if you can frame the idea of any figure,
abstracted from all particularities of size, or even from other sensible
qualities.
Hyl. Let me think a little - I do not find that I can.
Phil. And can you think it possible that should really exist in nature
which implies a repugnancy in its conception?
Hyl. By no means.
Phil. Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind to disunite the
ideas of extension and motion from all other sensible qualities, doth it not
follow, that where the one exist there necessarily the other exist likewise?
Hyl. It should seem so.
Phil. Consequently, the very same arguments which you admitted as
conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are, without any farther
application of force, against the Primary too. Besides, if you will trust your
senses, is it not plain all sensible qualities coexist, or to them appear as
being in the same place? Do they ever represent a motion, or figure, as being
divested of all other visible and tangible qualities?
Hyl. You need say no more on this head. I am free to own, if there be no
secret error or oversight in our proceedings hitherto, that all sensible
qualities are alike to be denied existence without the mind. But, my fear is
that I have been too liberal in my former concessions, or overlooked some
fallacy or other. In short, I did not take time to think.
Phil. For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time you please in
reviewing the progress of our inquiry. You are at liberty to recover any
slips you might have made, or offer whatever you have omitted which makes for
your first opinion.
Hyl. One great oversight I take to be this - that I did not sufficiently
distinguish the object from the sensation. Now, though this latter may not
exist without the mind, yet it will not thence follow that the former cannot.
Phil. What object do you mean? the object of the senses?
Hyl. The same.
Phil. It is then immediately perceived?
Hyl. Right.
Phil. Make me to understand the difference between what is immediately
perceived and a sensation.
Hyl. The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; besides
which, there is something perceived; and this I call the object. For example,
there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of perceiving those
colours is in me only, and not in the tulip.
Phil. What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which you see?
Hyl. The same.
Phil. And what do you see beside colour, figure, and extension?
Hyl. Nothing.
Phil. What you would say then is that the red and yellow are coexistent
with the extension; is it not?
Hyl. That is not all; I would say they have a real existence without the
mind, in some unthinking substance.
Phil. That the colours are really in the tulip which I see is manifest.
Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist independent of your mind or
mine; but, that any immediate object of the senses - that is, any idea, or
combination of ideas - should exist in an unthinking substance, or exterior to
all minds, is in itself an evident contradiction. Nor can I imagine how this
follows from what you said just now, to wit, that the red and yellow were on
the tulip you saw, since you do not pretend to see that unthinking substance.
Hyl. You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our inquiry from the
subject.
Phil. I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. To return then to
your distinction between sensation and object; if I take you right, you
distinguish in every perception two things, the one an action of the mind, the
other not.
Hyl. True.
Phil. And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any unthinking
thing; but, whatever beside is implied in a perception may?
Hyl. That is my meaning.
Phil. So that if there was a perception without any act of the mind, it
were possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking substance?
Hyl. I grant it. But it is impossible there should be such a perception.
Phil. When is the mind said to be active?
Hyl. When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, anything.
Phil. Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything, but by an
act of the will?
Hyl. It cannot.
Phil. The mind therefore is to be accounted active in its perceptions so
far forth as volition is included in them?
Hyl. It is.
Phil. In plucking this flower I am active; because I do it by the motion
of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition; so likewise in applying it
to my nose. But is either of these smelling?
Hyl. No.
Phil. I act too in drawing the air through my nose; because my breathing
so rather than otherwise is the effect of my volition. But neither can this
be called smelling: for, if it were, I should smell every time I breathed in
that manner?
Hyl. True.
Phil. Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this?
Hyl. It is.
Phil. But I do not find my will concerned any farther. Whatever more
there is - as that I perceive such a particular smell, or any smell at all -
this is independent of my will, and therein I am altogether passive. Do you
find it otherwise with you, Hylas?
Hyl. No, the very same.
Phil. Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open your eyes, or
keep them shut; to turn them this or that way?
Hyl. Without doubt.
Phil. But, doth it in like manner depend on your will that in looking on
this flower you perceive white rather than any other colour? Or, directing
your open eyes towards yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid seeing the
sun? Or is light or darkness the effect of your volition?
Hyl. No, certainly.
Phil. You are then in these respects altogether passive?
Hyl. I am.
Phil. Tell me now, whether seeing consists in perceiving light and
colours, or in opening and turning the eyes?
Hyl. Without doubt, in the former.
Phil. Since therefore you are in the very perception of light and colours
altogether passive, what is become of that action you were speaking of as an
ingredient in every sensation? And, doth it not follow from your own
concessions, that the perception of light and colours, including no action
in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance? And is not this a plain
contradiction?
Hyl. I know not what to think of it.
Phil. Besides, since you distinguish the active and passive in every
perception, you must do it in that of pain. But how is it possible that pain,
be it as little active as you please, should exist in an unperceiving
substance? In short, do but consider the point, and then confess ingenuously,
whether light and colours, tastes, sounds, &c. are not all equally passions or
sensations in the soul. You may indeed call them external objects, and give
them in words what subsistence you please. But, examine your own thoughts,
and then tell me whether it be not as I say?
Hyl. I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair observation of what
passes in my mind, I can discover nothing else but that I am a thinking being,
affected with variety of sensations; neither is it possible to conceive how a
sensation should exist in an unperceiving substance. - But then, on the other
hand, when I look on sensible things in a different view, considering them as
so many modes and qualities, I find it necessary to suppose a material
substratum, without which they cannot be conceived to exist.
Phil. Material substratum call you it? Pray, by which of your senses came
you acquainted with that being?
Hyl. It is not itself sensible; its modes and qualities only being
perceived by the senses.
Phil. I presume then it was by reflexion and reason you obtained the idea
of it?
Hyl. I do not pretend to any proper positive idea of it. However, I
conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be conceived to exist without a
support.
Phil. It seems then you have only a relative notion of it, or that you
conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving the relation it bears to sensible
qualities?
Hyl. Right.
Phil. Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that relation consists.
Hyl. Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term substratum, or
substance?
Phil. If so, the word substratum should import that it is spread under
the sensible qualities or accidents?
Hyl. True.
Phil. And consequently under extension?
Hyl. I own it.
Phil. It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely distinct from
extension?
Hyl. I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is something that
supports modes. And is it not evident the thing supported is different from
the thing supporting?
Phil. So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, extension is
supposed to be the substratum of extension?
Hyl. Just so.
Phil. Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without extension? or is
not the idea of extension necessarily included in spreading?
Hyl. It is.
Phil. Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under anything must have
in itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under which
it is spread?
Hyl. It must.
Phil. Consequently, every corporeal substance, being the substratum of
extension, must have in itself another extension, by which it is qualified to
be a substratum: and so on to infinity. And I ask whether this be not absurd
in itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now, to wit, that the
substratum was something distinct from and exclusive of extension?
Hyl. Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not mean that Matter is
spread in a gross literal sense under extension. The word substratum is used
only to express in general the same thing with substance.
Phil. Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the term
substance. Is it not that it stands under accidents?
Hyl. The very same.
Phil. But, that one thing may stand under or support another, must it not
be extended?
Hyl. It must.
Phil. Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity with
the former?
Hyl. You still take things in a strict literal sense. That is not fair,
Philonous.
Phil. I am not for imposing any sense on your words: you are at liberty
to explain them as you please. Only, I beseech you, make me understand
something by them. You tell me Matter supports or stands under accidents.
How! is it as your legs support your body?
Hyl. No; that is the literal sense.
Phil. Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you
understand it in. - How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas?
Hyl. I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I understood well
enough what was meant by Matter`s supporting accidents. But now, the more I
think on it the less can I comprehend it: in short I find that I know nothing
of it.
Phil. It seems then you have no idea at all, neither relative nor
positive, of Matter; you know neither what it is in itself, nor what relation
it bears to accidents?
Hyl. I acknowledge it.
Phil. And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how qualities or
accidents should really exist, without conceiving at the same time a material
support of them?
Hyl. I did.
Phil. That is to say, when you conceive the real existence of qualities,
you do withal conceive Something which you cannot conceive?
Hyl. It was wrong, I own. But still I fear there is some fallacy or
other. Pray what think you of this? It is just come into my head that the
ground of all our mistake lies in your treating of each quality by itself.
Now, I grant that each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind. Colour
cannot without extension, neither can figure without some other sensible
quality. But, as the several qualities united or blended together form entire
sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may not be supposed to exist
without the mind.
Phil. Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad memory. Though
indeed we went through all the qualities by name one after another, yet my
arguments or rather your concessions, nowhere tended to prove that the
Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by itself; but, that they were
not at all without the mind. Indeed, in treating of figure and motion we
concluded they could not exist without the mind, because it was impossible
even in thought to separate them from all secondary qualities, so as to
conceive them existing by themselves. But then this was not the only argument
made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass by all that hath been hitherto
said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so) I am content to put
the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or
combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without
the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so.
Hyl. If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What more easy
than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and
unperceived by, any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them
existing after that manner.
Phil. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time
unseen?
Hyl. No, that were a contradiction.
Phil. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing
which is unconceived?
Hyl. It is.
Phil. The tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by you?
Hyl. How should it be otherwise?
Phil. And what is conceived is surely in the mind?
Hyl. Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.
Phil. How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing
independent and out of all minds whatsoever?
Hyl. That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me
into it. - It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a
solitary place, where no one was present to see it, methought that was to
conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of; not considering that
I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see that all I can do
is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own thoughts the
idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but that is all. And this is far
from proving that I can conceive them existing out of the minds of all
Spirits.
Phil. You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how any
one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in the mind?
Hyl. I do.
Phil. And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which you
cannot so much as conceive?
Hyl. I profess I know not what to think; but still there are some
scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I see things at a distance? Do we
not perceive the stars and moon, for example, to be a great way off? Is not
this, I say, manifest to the senses?
Phil. Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects?
Hyl. I do.
Phil. And have they not then the same appearance of being distant?
Hyl. They have.
Phil. But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be
without the mind?
Hyl. By no means.
Phil. You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are
without the mind, from their appearance, or manner wherein they are perceived.
Hyl. I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in those cases?
Phil. By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately perceive,
neither sense nor reason informs you that it actually exists without the
mind. By sense you only know that you are affected with such certain
sensations of light and colours, &c. And these you will not say are without
the mind.
Hyl. True: but, beside all that, do you not think the sight suggests
something of outness or distance?
Phil. Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible size and figure
change perpetually, or do they appear the same at all distances?
Hyl. They are in a continual change.
Phil. Sight therefore doth not suggest, or any way inform you, that the
visible object you immediately perceive exists at a distance, or will be
perceived when you advance farther onward; there being a continued series of
visible objects succeeding each other during the whole time of your approach.
Hyl. It doth not; but still I know, upon seeing an object, what object I
shall perceive after having passed over a certain distance: no matter whether
it be exactly the same or no: there is still something of distance suggested
in the case.
Phil. Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point, and then tell me
whether there be any more in it than this: from the ideas you actually
perceive by sight, you have by experience learned to collect what other ideas
you will (according to the standing order of nature) be affected with, after
such a certain succession of time and motion.
Hyl. Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else.
Phil. Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born blind was on a
sudden made to see, he could at first have no experience of what may be
suggested by sight?
Hyl. It is.
Phil. He would not then, according to you, have any notion of distance
annexed to the things he saw; but would take them for a new set of sensations,
existing only in his mind?
Hyl. It is undeniable.
Phil. But, to make it still more plain: is not distance a line turned
endwise to the eye?
Hyl. It is.
Phil. And can a line so situated be perceived by sight?
Hyl. It cannot.
Phil. Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not properly and
immediately perceived by sight?
Hyl. It should seem so.
Phil. Again, is it your opinion that colours are at a distance?
Hyl. It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind.
Phil. But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting in the same
place with extension and figures?
Hyl. They do.
Phil. How can you then conclude from sight that figures exist without,
when you acknowledge colours do not; the sensible appearance being the very
same with regard to both?
Hyl. I know not what to answer.
Phil. But, allowing that distance was truly and immediately perceived by
the mind, yet it would not thence follow it existed out of the mind. For,
whatever is immediately perceived is an idea: and can any idea exist out of
the mind?
Hyl. To suppose that were absurd: but, inform me, Philonous, can we
perceive or know nothing beside our ideas?
Phil. As for the rational deducing of causes from effects, that is beside
our inquiry. And, by the senses you can best tell whether you perceive
anything which is not immediately perceived. And I ask you, whether the things
immediately perceived are other than your own sensations or ideas? You have
indeed more than once, in the course of this conversation, declared yourself
on those points; but you seem, by this last question, to have departed from
what you then thought.
Hyl. To speak the truth, Philonous, I think there are two kinds of
objects: - the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called ideas; the
other are real things or external objects, perceived by the mediation of
ideas, which are their images and representations. Now, I own ideas do not
exist without the mind; but the latter sort of objects do. I am sorry I did
not think of this distinction sooner; it would probably have cut short your
discourse.
Phil. Are those external objects perceived by sense or by some other
faculty?
Hyl. They are perceived by sense.
Phil. How!. Is there any thing perceived by sense which is not
immediately perceived?
Hyl. Yes, Philonous, in some sort there is. For example, when I look on
a picture or statue of Julius Caesar, I may be said after a manner to perceive
him (though not immediately) by my senses.
Phil. It seems then you will have our ideas, which alone are immediately
perceived, to be pictures of external things: and that these also are
perceived by sense, inasmuch as they have a conformity or resemblance to our
ideas?
Hyl. That is my meaning.
Phil. And, in the same way that Julius Caesar, in himself invisible, is
nevertheless perceived by sight; real things, in themselves imperceptible,
are perceived by sense.
Hyl. In the very same.
Phil. Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of Julius Caesar, do
you see with your eyes any more than some colours and figures, with a certain
symmetry and composition of the whole?
Hyl. Nothing else.
Phil. And would not a man who had never known anything of Julius Caesar
see as much?
Hyl. He would.
Phil. Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, in as perfect a
degree as you?
Hyl. I agree with you.
Phil. Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to the Roman
emperor, and his are not? This cannot proceed from the sensations or ideas of
sense by you then perceived; since you acknowledge you have no advantage over
him in that respect. It should seem therefore to proceed from reason and
memory: should it not?
Hyl. It should.
Phil. Consequently, it will not follow from that instance that anything
is perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived. Though I grant we
may, in one acceptation, be said to perceive sensible things mediately by
sense: that is, when, from a frequently perceived connexion, the immediate
perception of ideas by one sense suggests to the mind others, perhaps
belonging to another sense, which are wont to be connected with them. For
instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I perceive
only the sound; but, from the experience I have had that such a sound is
connected with a coach, I am said to hear the coach. It is nevertheless
evident that, in truth and strictness, nothing can be heard but sound; and the
coach is not then properly perceived by sense, but suggested from experience.
So likewise when we are said to see a red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and
heat of the iron are not the objects of sight, but suggested to the
imagination by the colour and figure which are properly perceived by that
sense. In short, those things alone are actually and strictly perceived by
any sense, which would have been perceived in case that same sense had then
been first conferred on us. As for other things, it is plain they are only
suggested to the mind by experience, grounded on former perceptions. But, to
return to your comparison of Caesar`s picture, it is plain, if you keep to
that, you must hold the real things, or archetypes of our ideas, are not
perceived by sense, but by some internal faculty of the soul, as reason or
memory. I would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from reason
for the existence of what you call real things or material objects. Or,
whether you remember to have seen them formerly as they are in themselves; or,
if you have heard or read of any one that did.
Hyl. I see, Philonous, you are disposed to raillery; but that will never
convince me.
Phil. My aim is only to learn from you the way to come at the knowledge
of material beings. Whatever we perceive is perceived immediately or
mediately: by sense, or by reason and reflexion. But, as you have excluded
sense, pray shew me what reason you have to believe their existence; or what
medium you can possibly make use of to prove it, either to mine or your own
understanding.
Hyl. To deal ingenuously, Philonous, now I consider the point, I do not
find I can give you any good reason for it. But, thus much seems pretty plain,
that it is at least possible such things may really exist. And, as long as
there is no absurdity in supposing them, I am resolved to believe as I did,
till you bring good reasons to the contrary.
Phil. What! Is it come to this, that you only believe the existence of
material objects, and that your belief is founded barely on the possibility of
its being true? Then you will have me bring reasons against it: though another
would think it reasonable the proof should lie on him who holds the
affirmative. And, after all, this very point which you are now resolved to
maintain, without any reason, is in effect what you have more than once during
this discourse seen good reason to give up. But, to pass over all this; if I
understand you rightly, you say our ideas do not exist without the mind, but
that they are copies, images, or representations, of certain originals that
do?
Hyl. You take me right.
Phil. They are then like external things?
Hyl. They are.
Phil. Have those things a stable and permanent nature, independent of our
senses; or are they in a perpetual change, upon our producing any motions in
our bodies-suspending, exerting, or altering, our faculties or organs of
sense?
Hyl. Real things, it is plain, have a fixed and real nature, which
remains the same notwithstanding any change in our senses, or in the posture
and motion of our bodies; which indeed may affect the ideas in our minds, but
it were absurd to think they had the same effect on things existing without
the mind.
Phil. How then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting and
variable as our ideas should be copies or images of anything fixed and
constant? Or, in other words, since all sensible qualities, as size, figure,
colour, &c., that is, our ideas, are continually changing, upon every
alteration in the distance, medium, or instruments of sensation; how can any
determinate material objects be properly represented or painted forth by
several distinct things, each of which is so different from and unlike the
rest? Or, if you say it resembles some one only of our ideas, how shall we be
able to distinguish the true copy from all the false ones?
Hyl. I profess, Philonous, I am at a loss. I know not what to say to
this.
Phil. But neither is this all. Which are material objects in
themselves - perceptible or imperceptible?
Hyl. Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but ideas. All
material things, therefore, are in themselves insensible, and to be perceived
only by our ideas.
Phil. Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes or originals
insensible?
Hyl. Right.
Phil. But how can that which is sensible be like that which is
insensible? Can a real thing, in itself invisible, be like a colour; or a real
thing, which is not audible, be like a sound? In a word, can anything be like
a sensation or idea, but another sensation or idea?
Hyl. I must own, I think not.
Phil. Is it possible there should be any doubt on the point? Do you not
perfectly know your own ideas?
Hyl. I know them perfectly; since what I do not perceive or know can be
no part of my idea.
Phil. Consider, therefore, and examine them, and then tell me if there be
anything in them which can exist without the mind: or if you can conceive
anything like them existing without the mind.
Hyl. Upon inquiry, I find it is impossible for me to conceive or
understand how anything but an idea can be like an idea. And it is most
evident that no idea can exist without the mind.
Phil. You are therefore, by your principles, forced to deny the reality
of sensible things; since you made it to consist in an absolute existence
exterior to the mind. That is to say, you are a downright sceptic. So I have
gained my point, which was to shew your principles led to Scepticism.
Hyl. For the present I am, if not entirely convinced, at least silenced.
Phil. I would fain know what more you would require in order to a
perfect conviction. Have you not had the liberty of explaining yourself all
manner of ways? Were any little slips in discourse laid hold and insisted on?
Or were you not allowed to retract or reinforce anything you had offered, as
best served your purpose? Hath not everything you could say been heard and
examined with all the fairness imaginable? In a word, have you not in every
point been convinced out of your own mouth? And, if you can at present
discover any flaw in any of your former concessions, or think of any remaining
subterfuge, any new distinction, colour, or comment whatsoever, why do you not
produce it?
Hyl. A little patience, Philonous. I am at present so amazed to see
myself ensnared, and as it were imprisoned in the labyrinths you have drawn me
into, that on the sudden it cannot be expected I should find my way out. You
must give me time to look about me and recollect myself.
Phil. Hark; is not this the college bell?
Hyl. It rings for prayers.
Phil. We will go in then, if you please, and meet here again tomorrow
morning. In the meantime, you may employ your thoughts on this morning`s
discourse, and try if you can find any fallacy in it, or invent any new means
to extricate yourself.
Hyl. Agreed.
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