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Second DialoguePart II
Part II
Phil. You acknowledge then God alone to be the cause of our ideas, and
that He causes them at the presence of those occasions.
Hyl. That is my opinion.
Phil. Those things which you say are present to God, without doubt He
perceives.
Hyl. Certainly; otherwise they could not be to Him an occasion of acting.
Phil. Not to insist now on your making sense of this hypothesis, or
answering all the puzzling questions and difficulties it is liable to: I only
ask whether the order and regularity observable in the series of our ideas,
or the course of nature, be not sufficiently accounted for by the wisdom and
power of God; and whether it doth not derogate from those attributes, to
suppose He is influenced, directed, or put in mind, when and what He is to
act, by an unthinking substance? And, lastly, whether, in case I granted all
you contend for, it would make anything to your purpose; it not being easy to
conceive how the external or absolute existence of an unthinking substance,
distinct from its being perceived, can be inferred from my allowing that
there are certain things perceived by the mind of God, which are to Him the
occasion of producing ideas in us?
Hyl. I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of occasion
seeming now altogether as groundless as the rest.
Phil. Do you not at length perceive that in all these different
acceptations of Matter, you have been only supposing you know not what, for no
manner of reason, and to no kind of use?
Hyl. I freely own myself less fond of my notions since they have been so
accurately examined. But still, methinks, I have some confused perception that
there is such a thing as Matter.
Phil. Either you perceive the being of Matter immediately or mediately.
If immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it. If
mediately, let me know by what reasoning it is inferred from those things
which you perceive immediately. So much for the perception. Then for the
Matter itself, I ask whether it is object, substratum, cause, instrument, or
occasion? You have already pleaded for each of these, shifting your notions,
and making Matter to appear sometimes in one shape, then in another. And what
you have offered hath been disapproved and rejected by yourself. If you have
anything new to advance I would gladly bear it.
Hyl. I think I have already offered all I had to say on those heads. I
am at a loss what more to urge.
Phil. And yet you are loath to part with your old prejudice. But, to make
you quit it more easily, I desire that, beside what has been hitherto
suggested, you will farther consider whether, upon supposition that Matter
exists, you can possibly conceive how you should be affected by it. Or,
supposing it did not exist, whether it be not evident you might for all that
be affected with the same ideas you now are, and consequently have the very
same reasons to believe its existence that you now can have.
Hyl. I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things just as we
do now, though there was no Matter in the world; neither can I conceive, if
there be Matter, how it should produce any idea in our minds. And, I do
farther grant you have entirely satisfied me that it is impossible there
should be such a thing as Matter in any of the foregoing acceptations. But
still I cannot help supposing that there is Matter in some sense or other.
What that is I do not indeed pretend to determine.
Phil. I do not expect you should define exactly the nature of that
unknown being. Only be pleased to tell me whether it is a Substance; and if
so, whether you can suppose a Substance without accidents; or, in case you
suppose it to have accidents or qualities, I desire you will let me know what
those qualities are, at least what is meant by Matter`s supporting them?
Hyl. We have already argued on those points. I have no more to say to
them. But, to prevent any farther questions, let me tell you I at present
understand by Matter neither substance nor accident, thinking nor extended
being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, but Something entirely
unknown, distinct from all these.
Phil. It seems then you include in your present notion of Matter nothing
but the general abstract idea of entity.
Hyl. Nothing else; save only that I super-add to this general idea the
negation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas, that I perceive,
imagine, or in anywise apprehend.
Phil. Pray where do you suppose this unknown Matter to exist?
Hyl. Oh Philonous! now you think you have entangled me; for, if I say it
exists in place, then you will infer that it exists in the mind, since it is
agreed that place or extension exists only in the mind. But I am not ashamed
to own my ignorance. I know not where it exists; only I am sure it exists not
in place. There is a negative answer for you. And you must expect no other to
all the questions you put for the future about Matter.
Phil. Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to inform
me after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what you mean by its
existence?
Hyl. It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is perceived.
Phil. But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its
existence?
Hyl. Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive notion or
meaning at all. I tell you again, I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know
not what is meant by its existence, or how it exists.
Phil. Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part, and tell me
sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of Entity in general,
prescinded from and exclusive of all thinking and corporeal beings, all
particular things whatsoever.
Hyl. Hold, let me think a little - I profess, Philonous, I do not find
that I can. At first glance, methought I had some dilute and airy notion of
Pure Entity in abstract; but, upon closer attention, it hath quite vanished
out of sight. The more I think on it, the more am I confirmed in my prudent
resolution of giving none but negative answers, and not pretending to the
least degree of any positive knowledge or conception of Matter, its where, its
how, its entity, or anything belonging to it.
Phil. When, therefore, you speak of the existence of Matter, you have
not any notion in your mind?
Hyl. None at all.
Phil. Pray tell me if the case stands not thus: - At first, from a belief
of material substance, you would have it that the immediate objects existed
without the mind; then that they are archetypes; then causes; next
instruments; then occasions: lastly something in general, which being
interpreted proves nothing. So Matter comes to nothing. What think you, Hylas,
is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding?
Hyl. Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that our not being
able to conceive a thing is no argument against its existence.
Phil. That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other circumstance,
there may reasonably be inferred the existence of a thing not immediately
perceived; and that it were absurd for any man to argue against the existence
of that thing, from his having no direct and positive notion of it, I freely
own. But, where there is nothing of all this; where neither reason nor
revelation induces us to believe the existence of a thing; where we have not
even a relative notion of it; where an abstraction is made from perceiving and
being perceived, from Spirit and idea: lastly, where there is not so much as
the most inadequate or faint idea pretended to - I will not indeed thence
conclude against the reality of any notion, or existence of anything; but my
inference shall be, that you mean nothing at all; that you employ words to no
manner of purpose, without any design or signification whatsoever. And I leave
it to you to consider how mere jargon should be treated.
Hyl. To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments seem in
themselves unanswerable; but they have not so great an effect on me as to
produce that entire conviction, that hearty acquiescence, which attends
demonstration. I find myself relapsing into an obscure surmise of I know not
what, matter.
Phil. But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things must concur to
take away all scruple, and work a plenary assent in the mind? Let a visible
object be set in never so clear a light, yet, if there is any imperfection in
the sight, or if the eye is not directed towards it, it will not be distinctly
seen. And though a demonstration be never so well grounded and fairly
proposed, yet, if there is withal a stain of prejudice, or a wrong bias on the
understanding, can it be expected on a sudden to perceive clearly, and adhere
firmly to the truth? No; there is need of time and pains: the attention must
be awakened and detained by a frequent repetition of the same thing placed oft
in the same, oft in different lights. I have said it already, and find I must
still repeat and inculcate, that it is an unaccountable licence you take, in
pretending to maintain you know not what, for you know not what reason, to you
know not what purpose. Can this be paralleled in any art or science, any sect
or profession of men? Or is there anything so barefacedly groundless and
unreasonable to be met with even in the lowest of common conversation? But,
perhaps you will still say, Matter may exist; though at the same time you
neither know what is meant by Matter, or by its existence. This indeed is
surprising, and the more so because it is altogether voluntary [and of your
own head^3], you not being led to it by any one reason; for I challenge you to
shew me that thing in nature which needs Matter to explain or account for it.
[Footnote 3: Omitted in last edition.]
Hyl. The reality of things cannot be maintained without supposing the
existence of Matter. And is not this, think you, a good reason why I should be
earnest in its defence?
Phil. The reality of things! What things? sensible or intelligible?
Hyl. Sensible things.
Phil. My glove for example?
Hyl. That, or any other thing perceived by the senses.
Phil. But to fix on some particular thing. Is it not a sufficient
evidence to me of the existence of this glove, that I see it, and feel it, and
wear it? Or, if this will not do, how is it possible I should be assured of
the reality of this thing, which I actually see in this place, by supposing
that some unknown thing, which I never did or can see, exists after an
unknown manner, in an unknown place, or in no place at all? How can the
supposed reality of that which is intangible be a proof that anything tangible
really exists? Or, of that which is invisible, that any visible things, or, in
general of anything which is imperceptible, that a perceptible exists? Do
but explain this and I shall think nothing too hard for you.
Hyl. Upon the whole, I am content to own the existence of matter is
highly improbable; but the direct and absolute impossibility of it does not
appear to me.
Phil. But granting Matter to be possible, yet, upon that account merely,
it can have no more claim to existence than a golden mountain, or a centaur.
Hyl. I acknowledge it; but still you do not deny it is possible; and that
which is possible, for aught you know, may actually exist.
Phil. I deny it to be possible; and have, if I mistake not, evidently
proved, from your own concessions, that it is not. In the common sense of
the word Matter, is there any more implied than an extended, solid, figured,
moveable substance, existing without the mind? And have not you acknowledged,
over and over, that you have seen evident reason for denying the possibility
of such a substance?
Hyl. True, but that is only one sense of the term Matter.
Phil. But is it not the only proper genuine received sense? And, if
Matter, in such a sense, be proved impossible, may it not be thought with
good grounds absolutely impossible? Else how could anything be proved
impossible? Or, indeed, how could there be any proof at all one way or other,
to a man who takes the liberty to unsettle and change the common signification
of words?
Hyl. I thought philosophers might be allowed to speak more accurately
than the vulgar, and were not always confined to the common acceptation of a
term.
Phil. But this now mentioned is the common received sense among
philosophers themselves. But, not to insist on that, have you, not been
allowed to take Matter in what sense you pleased? And have you not used this
privilege in the utmost extent; sometimes entirely changing, at others
leaving out, or putting into the definition of it whatever, for the present,
best served your design, contrary to all the known rules of reason and
logic? And hath not this shifting, unfair method of yours spun out our
dispute to an unnecessary length; Matter having been particularly examined,
and by your own confession refuted in each of those senses? And can any more
be required to prove the absolute impossibility of a thing, than the proving
it impossible in every particular sense that either you or any one else
understands it in?
Hyl. But I am not so thoroughly satisfied that you have proved the
impossibility of Matter, in the last most obscure abstracted and indefinite
sense.
Phil. When is a thing shewn to be impossible?
Hyl. When a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended
in its definition.
Phil. But where there are no ideas, there no repugnancy can be
demonstrated between ideas?
Hyl. I agree with you.
Phil. Now, in that which you call the obscure indefinite sense of the
word Matter, it is plain, by your own confession, there was included no idea
at all, no sense except an unknown sense; which is the same thing as none.
You are not, therefore, to expect I should prove a repugnancy between ideas,
where there are no ideas; or the impossibility of Matter taken in an unknown
sense, that is, no sense at all. My business was only to shew you meant
nothing; and this you were brought to own. So that, in all your various
senses, you have been shewed either to mean nothing at all, of, if anything,
an absurdity. And if this be not sufficient to prove the impossibility of a
thing, I desire you will let me know what is.
Hyl. I acknowledge you have proved that Matter is impossible; nor do
I see what more can be said in defence of it. But, at the same time that I
give up this, I suspect all my other notions. For surely, none could be more
seemingly evident than this once was: and yet it now seems as false and absurd
as ever it did true before. But I think we have discussed the point
sufficiently for the present. The remaining part of the day I would willingly
spend in running over in my thoughts the several heads of this morning`s
conversation, and tomorrow shall be glad to meet you here again about the same
time.
Phil. I will not fail to attend you.
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