|
Third DialoguePart I
Part I
Philonous. Tell me, Hylas,^1 what are the fruits of yesterday`s
meditation? Has it confirmed you in the same mind you were in at parting? or
have you since seen cause to change your opinion?
[Footnote 1: "Tell me, Hylas" - "So Hylas" - in first and second editions.]
Hylas. Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are alike vain and
uncertain. What we approve to-day, we condemn to-morrow. We keep a stir
about knowledge, and spend our lives in the pursuit of it, when, alas! we
know nothing all the while: nor do I think it possible for us ever to know
anything in this life. Our faculties are too narrow and too few. Nature
certainly never intended us for speculation.
Phil. What! Say you we can know nothing, Hylas?
Hyl. There is not that single thing in the world whereof we can know
the real nature, or what it is in itself.
Phil. Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or water is?
Hyl. You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and water fluid; but this
is no more than knowing what sensations are produced in your own mind, upon
the application of fire and water to your organs of sense. Their internal
constitution, their true and real nature, you are utterly in the dark as to
that.
Phil. Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, and that
which I see before my eyes to be a real tree?
Hyl. Know? No, it is impossible you or any man alive should know it.
All you know is, that you have such a certain idea or appearance in your own
mind. But what is this to the real tree or stone? I tell you that colour,
figure, and hardness, which you perceive, are not the real natures of those
things, or in the least like them. The same may be said of all other real
things, or corporeal substances, which compose the world. They have none of
them anything of themselves, like those sensible qualities by us perceived.
We should not therefore pretend to affirm or know anything of them, as they
are in their own nature.
Phil. But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example, from iron:
and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was?
Hyl. Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish between your own
ideas. That yellowness, that weight, and other sensible qualities, think you
they are really in the gold? They are only relative to the senses, and have no
absolute existence in nature. And in pretending to distinguish the species of
real things, by the appearances in your mind, you may perhaps act as wisely as
he that should conclude two men were of a different species, because their
clothes were not of the same colour.
Phil. It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the appearances of
things, and those false ones too. The very meat I eat, and the cloth I wear,
have nothing in them like what I see and feel.
Hyl. Even so.
Phil. But is it not strange the whole world should be thus imposed on,
and so foolish as to believe their senses? And yet I know not how it is, but
men eat, and drink, and sleep, and perform all the offices of life, as
comfortably and conveniently as if they really knew the things they are
conversant about.
Hyl. They do so: but you know ordinary practice does not require a nicety
of speculative knowledge. Hence the vulgar retain their mistakes, and for all
that make a shift to bustle through the affairs of life. But philosophers know
better things.
Phil. You mean, they know that they know nothing.
Hyl. That is the very top and perfection of human knowledge.
Phil. But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you seriously
persuaded that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you are going to
write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like another man; and do
you not know what it is you call for?
Hyl. How often must I tell you, that I know not the real nature of any
one thing in the universe? I may indeed upon occasion make use of pen, ink,
and paper. But what any one of them is in its own true nature, I declare
positively I know not. And the same is true with regard to every other
corporeal thing. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the true and
real nature of things, but even of their existence. It cannot be denied that
we perceive such certain appearances or ideas; but it cannot be concluded from
thence that bodies really exist. Nay, now I think on it, I must, agreeably to
my former concessions, farther declare that it is impossible any real
corporeal thing should exist in nature.
Phil. You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild and extravagant than the
notions you now maintain: and is it not evident you are led into all these
extravagances by the belief of material substance? This makes you dream of
those unknown natures in everything. It is this occasions your distinguishing
between the reality and sensible appearances of things. It is to this you are
indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else knows perfectly well. Nor
is this all: you are not only ignorant of the true nature of everything, but
you know not whether anything really exists, or whether there are any true
natures at all; forasmuch as you attribute to your material beings an absolute
or external existence, wherein you suppose their reality consists. And, as you
are forced in the end to acknowledge such an existence means either a direct
repugnancy, or nothing at all, it follows that you are obliged to pull down
your own hypothesis of material Substance, and positively to deny the real
existence of any part of the universe. And so you are plunged into the deepest
and most deplorable scepticism that ever man was. Tell me, Hylas, is it not as
I say?
Hyl. I agree with you. Material substance was no more than an hypothesis;
and a false and groundless one too. I will no longer spend my breath in
defence of it. But whatever hypothesis you advance, or whatsoever scheme of
things you introduce in its stead, I doubt not it will appear every whit as
false: let me but be allowed to question you upon it. That is, suffer me to
serve you in your own kind, and I warrant it shall conduct you through as
many perplexities and contradictions, to the very same state of scepticism
that I myself am in at present.
Phil. I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any hypothesis at
all. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave
things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion that the real things are
those very things I see, and feel, and perceive by my senses. These I know;
and, finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life, have no
reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings. A piece of sensible
bread, for instance, would stay my stomach better than ten thousand times as
much of that insensible, unintelligible, real bread you speak of. It is
likewise my opinion that colours and other sensible qualities are on the
objects. I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is white, and fire hot.
You indeed, who by snow and fire mean certain external, unperceived,
unperceiving substances, are in the right to deny whiteness or heat to be
affections inherent in them. But I, who understand by those words the things
I see and feel, am obliged to think like other folks. And, as I am no sceptic
with regard to the nature of things, so neither am I as to their existence.
That a thing should be really perceived by my senses, and at the same time not
really exist, is to me a plain contradiction; since I cannot prescind or
abstract, even in thought, the existence of a sensible thing from its being
perceived. Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like things, which
I name and discourse of, are things that I know. And I should not have known
them but that I perceived them by my senses; and things perceived by the
senses are immediately perceived; and things immediately perceived are ideas;
and ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore consists in
being perceived; when, therefore, they are actually perceived there can be no
doubt of their existence. Away then with all that scepticism, all those
ridiculous philosophical doubts. What a jest is it for a philosopher to
question the existence of sensible things, till he hath it proved to him from
the veracity of God; or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of
intuition or demonstration! I might as well doubt of my own being, as of the
being of those things I actually see and feel.
Hyl. Not so fast, Philonous: you say you cannot conceive how sensible
things should exist without the mind. Do you not?
Phil. I do.
Hyl. Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible that
things perceivable by sense may still exist?
Phil. I can; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny sensible
things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but
all minds. Now, it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind; since
I find them by experience to be independent of it. There is therefore some
other Mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of my
perceiving them: as likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my
supposed annihilation. And, as the same is true with regard to all other
finite created spirits, it necessarily follows there is an omnipresent eternal
Mind, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in
such a manner, and according to such rules, as He Himself hath ordained, and
are by us termed the laws of nature.
Hyl. Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert beings? Or
have they any agency included in them?
Phil. They are altogether passive and inert.
Hyl. And is not God an agent, a being purely active?
Phil. I acknowledge it.
Hyl. No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the nature of God?
Phil. It cannot.
Hyl. Since therefore you have no idea of the mind of God, how can you
conceive it possible that things should exist in His mind? Or, if you can
conceive the mind of God, without having an idea of it, why may not I be
allowed to conceive the existence of Matter, notwithstanding I have no idea of
it?
Phil. As to your first question: I own I have properly no idea, either of
God or any other spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by
things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do nevertheless know that I, who
am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly as I know my ideas
exist. Farther, I know what I mean by the terms I and myself; and I know this
immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a
triangle, a colour, or a sound. The Mind, Spirit, or Soul is that indivisible
unextended thing which thinks, acts, and perceives. I say indivisible, because
unextended; and unextended, because extended, figured, moveable things are
ideas; and that which perceives ideas, which thinks and wills, is plainly
itself no idea, nor like an idea. Ideas are things inactive, and perceived.
And Spirits a sort of beings altogether different from them. I do not
therefore say my soul is an idea, or like an idea. However, taking the word
idea in a large sense, my soul may be said to furnish me with an idea, that
is, an image or likeness of God - though indeed extremely inadequate. For, all
the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening
its powers, and removing its imperfections. I have, therefore, though not an
inactive idea, yet in myself some sort of an active thinking image of the
Deity. And, though I perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him, or
know Him by reflexion and reasoning. My own mind and my own ideas I have an
immediate knowledge of; and, by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the
possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas. Farther, from my own
being, and from the dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do, by an act
of reason, necessarily infer the existence of a God, and of all created things
in the mind of God. So much for your first question. For the second: I suppose
by this time you can answer it yourself. For you neither perceive Matter
objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea; nor know it, as you do
yourself, by a reflex act, neither do you mediately apprehend it by similitude
of the one or the other; nor yet collect it by reasoning from that which you
know immediately. All which makes the case of Matter widely different from
that of the Deity.
[Hyl. You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of an idea or
image of God. But, at the same time, you acknowledge you have, properly
speaking, no idea of your own soul. You even affirm that spirits are a sort
of beings altogether different from ideas. Consequently that no idea can be
like a spirit. We have therefore no idea of any spirit. You admit nevertheless
that there is spiritual Substance, although you have no idea of it; while you
deny there can be such a thing as material Substance, because you have no
notion or idea of it. Is this fair dealing? To act consistently, you must
either admit Matter or reject Spirit. What say you to this?
[Footnote 2: This important passage, printed within brackets, is not found in
the first and second editions of the Dialogues. It is, by anticipation,
Berkeley`s answer to Hume`s application of the objections to the reality of
abstract or unperceived Matter, to the reality of the Ego or Self, of which we
are aware through memory, as identical amid the changes of its successive
states. - A. C. F.]
Phil. I say, in the first place, that I do not deny the existence of
material substance, merely because I have no notion of it, but because the
notion of it is inconsistent; or, in other words, because it is repugnant that
there should be a notion of it. Many things, for aught I know, may exist,
whereof neither I nor any other man hath or can have any idea or notion
whatsoever. But then those things must be possible, that is, nothing
inconsistent must be included in their definition. I say, secondly, that,
although we believe things to exist which we do not perceive, yet we may not
believe that any particular thing exists, without some reason for such
belief: but I have no reason for believing the existence of Matter. I have no
immediate intuition thereof: neither can I immediately from my sensations,
ideas, notions, actions, or passions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving,
inactive Substance - either by probable deduction, or necessary consequence.
Whereas the being of my Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or thinking
principle, I evidently know by reflexion. You will forgive me if I repeat the
same things in answer to the same objections. In the very notion or definition
of material Substance, there is included a manifest repugnance and
inconsistency. But this cannot be said of the notion of Spirit. That ideas
should exist in what doth not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act,
is repugnant. But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should
be the subject of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them. It is granted
we have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of the
existence of other finite spirits; but it will not thence follow that such
spirits are on a foot with material substances: if to suppose the one be
inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent to suppose the other; if the one can
be inferred by no argument, and there is a probability for the other, if we
see signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves, and
see no sign or symptom whatever that leads to a rational belief of Matter. I
say, lastly, that I have a notion of Spirit, though I have not, strictly
speaking, an idea of it. I do not perceive it as an idea, or by means of an
idea, but know it by reflexion.
Hyl. Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, according to
your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles, it
should follow that you are only a system of floating ideas, without any
substance to support them. Words are not to be used without a meaning. And, as
there is no more meaning in spiritual Substance than in material Substance.
the one is to be exploded as well as the other.
Phil. How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own
being; and that I myself am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking,
active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas. I
know that I, one and the same self, perceive both colours and sounds: that a
colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour: that I am therefore one
individual principle, distinct from colour and sound; and, for the same
reason, from all other sensible things and inert ideas. But, I am not in like
manner conscious either of the existence or essence of Matter. On the
contrary, I know that nothing inconsistent can exist, and that the existence
of Matter implies an inconsistency. Father, I know what I mean when I affirm
that there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas, that is, that a
spirit knows and perceives ideas. But, I do not know what is meant when it is
said that an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either
ideas or the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon the whole no parity
of case between Spirit and Matter.^2]
[Footnote 2: This important passage, printed within brackets, is not found in
the first and second editions of the Dialogues. It is, by anticipation,
Berkeley`s answer to Hume`s application of the objections to the reality of
abstract or unperceived Matter, to the reality of the Ego or Self, of which we
are aware through memory, as identical amid the changes of its successive
states. - A. C. F.]
Hyl. I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you in earnest think
the real existence of sensible things consists in their being actually
perceived? If so; how comes it that all mankind distinguish between them? Ask
the first man you meet, and he shall tell you, to be perceived is one thing,
and to exist is another.
Phil. I am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world
for the truth of my notion. Ask the gardener why he thinks yonder cherry-tree
exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees and feels it;
in a word, because he perceives it by his senses. Ask him why he thinks an
orange-tree not to be there, and he shall tell you, because he does not
perceive it. What he perceives by sense, that he terms a real being, and saith
it is or exists; but, that which is not perceivable, the same, he saith, hath
no being.
Hyl. Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing consists
in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.
Phil. And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea exist without
being actually perceived? These are points long since agreed between us.
Hyl. But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny it
is shocking, and contrary to the common sense of men. Ask the fellow whether
yonder tree hath an existence out of his mind: what answer think you he would
make?
Phil. The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth exist out of
his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say, the
real tree, existing without his mind, is truly known and comprehended by (that
is exists in) the infinite mind of God. Probably he may not at first glance
be aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this; inasmuch as the
very being of a tree, or any other sensible thing, implies a mind wherein it
is. But the point itself he cannot deny. The question between the Meterialists
and me is not, whether things have a real existence out of the mind of this
or that person, but whether they have an absolute existence, distinct from
being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds. This indeed some heathens
and philosophers have affirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the Deity
suitable to the Holy Scriptures will be of another opinion.
Hyl. But, according to your notions, what difference is there between
real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a
dream - since they are all equally in the mind?
Phil. The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct; they
have, besides, an entire dependence on the will. But the ideas perceived by
sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear; and, being imprinted on
the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not the like dependence on our
will. There is therefore no danger of confounding these with the foregoing:
and there is as little of confounding them with the visions of a dream, which
are dim, irregular, and confused. And, though they should happen to be never
so lively and natural, yet, by their not being connected, and of a piece with
the preceding and subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily be
distinguished from realities. In short, by whatever method you distinguish
things from chimeras on your scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also
upon mine. For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference; and I
am not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive.
Hyl. But still, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in the world but
spirits and ideas. And this, you must needs acknowledge, sounds very oddly.
Phil. I own the word idea, not being commonly used for thing, sounds
something out of the way. My reason for using it was, because a necessary
relation to the mind is understood to be implied by that term; and it is now
commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate objects of the
understanding. But, however oddly the proposition may sound in words, yet it
includes nothing so very strange or shocking in its sense; which in effect
amounts to no more than this, to wit, that there are only things perceiving,
and things perceived; or that every unthinking being is necessarily, and from
the very nature of its existence, perceived by some mind; if not by a finite
created mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind of God, in whom "we live,
and move, and have our being." Is this as strange as to say, the sensible
qualities are not on the objects: or that we cannot be sure of the existence
of things, or know any thing of their real natures - though we both see and
feel them, and perceive them by all our senses?
Hyl. And, in consequence of this, must we not think there are no such
things as physical or corporeal causes; but that a Spirit is the immediate
cause of all the phenomena in nature? Can there be anything more extravagant
than this?
Phil. Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say - a thing which is
inert operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving is the cause of our
perceptions, [without any regard either to consistency, or the old known
axiom, Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself^3]. Besides,
that which to you, I know not for what reason, seems so extravagant is no
more than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred places. In them God is
represented as the sole and immediate Author of all those effects which some
heathens and philosophers are wont to ascribe to Nature, Matter, Fate, or the
like unthinking principle. This is so much the constant language of Scripture
that it were needless to confirm it by citations.
[Footnote 3: The words within brackets are omitted in the third edition.]
Hyl. You are not aware, Philonous, that in making God the immediate
Author of all the motions in nature, you make Him the Author of murder,
sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins.
Phil. In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation of guilt
is the same, whether a person commits an action with or without an
instrument. In case therefore you suppose God to act by the mediation of an
instrument or occasion, called Matter, you as truly make Him the author of
sin as I, who think Him the immediate agent in all those operations vulgarly
ascribed to Nature. I farther observe that sin or moral turpitude doth not
consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in the internal
deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion. This is plain, in
that the killing an enemy in a battle, or putting a criminal legally to
death, is not thought sinful; though the outward act be the very same with
that in the case of murder. Since, therefore, sin doth not consist in the
physical action, the making God an immediate cause of all such actions is not
making Him the Author of sin. Lastly, I have nowhere said that God is the
only agent who produces all the motions in bodies. It is true I have denied
there are any other agents besides spirits; but this is very consistent with
allowing to thinking rational beings, in the production of motions, the use
of limited powers, ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under
the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all
the guilt of their actions.
Hyl. But the denying Matter, Philonous, or corporeal Substance; there is
the point. You can never persuade me that this is not repugnant to the
universal sense of mankind. Were our dispute to be determined by most voices,
I am confident you would give up the point, without gathering the votes.
Phil. I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and submitted to the
judgment of men who had plain common sense, without the prejudices of a
learned education. Let me be represented as one who trusts his senses, who
thinks he knows the things he sees and feels, and entertains no doubts of
their existence; and you fairly set forth with all your doubts, your
paradoxes, and your scepticism about you, and I shall willingly acquiesce in
the determination of any indifferent person. That there is no substance
wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me evident. And that the objects
immediately perceived are ideas, is on all hands agreed. And that sensible
qualities are objects immediately perceived no one can deny. It is therefore
evident there can be no substratum of those qualities but spirit; in which
they exist, not by way of mode or property, but as a thing perceived in that
which perceives it. I deny therefore that there is any unthinking substratum
of the objects of sense, and in that acceptation that there is any material
substance. But if by material substance is meant only sensible body - that
which is seen and felt (and the unphilosophical part of the world, I dare
say, mean no more) - then I am more certain of matter`s existence than you or
any other philosopher pretend to be. If there be anything which makes the
generality of mankind averse from the notions I espouse, it is a
misapprehension that I deny the reality of sensible things. But, as it is you
who are guilty of that, and not I, it follows that in truth their aversion is
against your notions and not mine. I do therefore assert that I am as certain
as of my own being, that there are bodies or corporeal substances (meaning
the things I perceive by my senses); and that, granting this, the bulk of
mankind will take no thought about, nor think themselves at all concerned in
the fate of those unknown natures, and philosophical quiddities, which some
men are so fond of.
Hyl. What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the
reality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistaken in thinking the
moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; or a square tower, seen
at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the water, crooked?
Phil. He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives,
but in the inference he makes from his present perceptions. Thus, in the case
of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and
so far he is in the right. But if he thence conclude that upon taking the oar
out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness; or that it would
affect his touch as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken. In
like manner, if he shall conclude from what he perceives in one station,
that, in case he advances towards the moon or tower, he should still be
affected with the like ideas, he is mistaken. But his mistake lies not in
what he perceives immediately, and at present, (it being a manifest
contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that) but in the wrong
judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be connected with
those immediately perceived: or, concerning the ideas that, from what he
perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in other circumstances.
The case is the same with regard to the Copernican system. We do not here
perceive any motion of the earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude,
that, in case we were placed at as great a distance from that as we are now
from the other planets, we should not then perceive its motion.
Hyl. I understand you; and must needs own you say things plausible
enough. But, give me leave to put you in mind of one thing. Pray, Philonous,
were you not formerly as positive that Matter existed, as you are now that it
does not?
Phil. I was. But here lies the difference. Before, my positiveness was
founded, without examination, upon prejudice; but now, after inquiry, upon
evidence.
|
