Hyl. After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than things.
We agree in the thing, but differ in the name. That we are affected with
ideas from without is evident; and it is no less evident that there must be
(I will not say archetypes, but) Powers without the mind, corresponding to
those ideas. And, as these Powers cannot subsist by themselves, there is some
subject of them necessarily to be admitted; which I call Matter, and you call
Spirit. This is all the difference.
Phil. Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, or subject of powers,
Hyl. It hath not extension; but it hath the power to raise in you the
idea of extension.
Phil. It is therefore itself unextended?
Hyl. I grant it.
Phil. Is it not also active?
Hyl. Without doubt. Otherwise, how could we attribute powers to it?
Phil. Now let me ask you two questions: First, Whether it be agreeable
to the usage either of philosophers or others to give the name Matter to an
unextended active being? And, Secondly, Whether it be not ridiculously absurd
to misapply names contrary to the common use of language?
Hyl. Well then, let it not be called Matter, since you will have it so,
but some Third Nature distinct from Matter and Spirit. For what reason is
there why you should call it Spirit? Does not the notion of spirit imply that
it is thinking, as well as active and unextended?
Phil. My reason is this: because I have a mind to have some notion of
meaning in what I say: but I have no notion of any action distinct from
volition, neither can I conceive volition to be anywhere but in a spirit:
therefore, when I speak of an active being, I am obliged to mean a Spirit.
Beside, what can be plainer than that a thing which hath no ideas in itself
cannot impart them to me; and, if it hath ideas, surely it must be a Spirit.
To make you comprehend the point still more clearly if it be possible, I
assert as well as you that, since we are affected from without, we must allow
Powers to be without, in a Being distinct from ourselves. So far we are
agreed. But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful Being. I will have
it to be Spirit, you Matter, or I know not what (I may add too, you know not
what) Third Nature. Thus, I prove it to be Spirit. From the effects I see
produced, I conclude there are actions; and, because actions, volitions; and,
because there are volitions, there must be a will. Again, the things I
perceive must have an existence, they or their archetypes, out of my mind:
but, being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than
in an understanding; there is therefore an understanding. But will and
understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. The powerful
cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a Spirit.
Hyl. And now I warrant you think you have made the point very clear,
little suspecting that what you advance leads directly to a contradiction. Is
it not an absurdity to imagine any imperfection in God?
Phil. Without a doubt.
Hyl. To suffer pain is an imperfection?
Phil. It is.
Hyl. Are we not sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness by some
Phil. We are.
Hyl. And have you not said that Being is a Spirit, and is not that Spirit
Phil. I grant it.
Hyl. But you have asserted that whatever ideas we perceive from without
are in the mind which affects us. The ideas, therefore, of pain and uneasiness
are in God; or, in other words, God suffers pain: that is to say, there is an
imperfection in the Divine nature: which, you acknowledged, was absurd. So you
are caught in a plain contradiction.
Phil. That God knows or understands all things, and that He knows, among
other things, what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation, and what it
is for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no question. But, that God, though
He knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us, can Himself suffer
pain, I positively deny. We, who are limited and dependent spirits, are liable
to impressions of sense, the effects of an external Agent, which, being
produced against our wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy. But God, whom no
external being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we do; whose will
is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or
resisted by nothing: it is evident, such a Being as this can suffer nothing,
nor be affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all. We
are chained to a body: that is to say, our perceptions are connected with
corporeal motions. By the law of our nature, we are affected upon every
alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body; which sensible body,
rightly considered, is nothing but a complexion of such qualities or ideas as
have no existence distinct from being perceived by a mind. So that this
connexion of sensations with corporeal motions means no more than a
correspondence in the order of nature, between two sets of ideas, or things
immediately perceivable. But God is a Pure Spirit, disengaged from all such
sympathy, or natural ties. No corporeal motions are attended with the
sensations of pain or pleasure in His mind. To know everything knowable, is
certainly a perfection; but to endure, or suffer, or feel anything by sense,
is an imperfection. The former, I say, agrees to God, but not the latter. God
knows, or hath ideas; but His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours
are. Your not distinguishing, where there is so manifest a difference, makes
you fancy you see an absurdity where there is none.
Hyl. But, all this while you have not considered that the quantity of
Matter has been demonstrated to be proportioned to the gravity of bodies. And
what can withstand demonstration?
Phil. Let me see how you demonstrate that point.
Hyl. I lay it down for a principle, that the moments or quantities of
motion in bodies are in a direct compounded reason of the velocities and
quantities of Matter contained in them. Hence, where the velocities are equal,
it follows the moments are directly as the quantity of Matter in each. But it
is found by experience that all bodies (bating the small inequalities, arising
from the resistance of the air) descend with an equal velocity; the motion
therefore of descending bodies, and consequently their gravity, which is the
cause or principle of that motion, is proportional to the quantity of Matter;
which was to be demonstrated.
Phil. You lay it down as a self-evident principle that the quantity of
motion in any body is proportional to the velocity and Matter taken together;
and this is made use of to prove a proposition from whence the existence of
Matter is inferred. Pray is not this arguing in a circle?
Hyl. In the premise I only mean that the motion is proportional to the
velocity, jointly with the extension and solidity.
Phil. But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence follow that
gravity is proportional to Matter, in your philosophic sense of the word;
except you take it for granted that unknown substratum, or whatever else you
call it, is proportional to those sensible qualities; which to suppose is
plainly begging the question. That there is magnitude and solidity, or
resistance, perceived by sense, I readily grant; as likewise, that gravity
may be proportional to those qualities I will not dispute. But that either
these qualities as perceived by us, or the powers producing them, do exist in
a material substratum; this is what I deny, and you indeed affirm, but,
notwithstanding your demonstration, have not yet proved.
Hyl. I shall insist no longer on that point. Do you think, however, you
shall persuade me that the natural philosophers have been dreaming all this
while? Pray what becomes of all their hypotheses and explications of the
phenomena, which suppose the existence of Matter?
Phil. What mean you, Hylas, by the phenomena?
Hyl. I mean the appearances which I perceive by my senses.
Phil. And the appearances perceived by sense, are they not ideas?
Hyl. I have told you so a hundred times.
Phil. Therefore to explain the phenomena, is to shew how we come to be
affected with ideas, in that manner and order wherein they are imprinted on
our senses. Is it not?
Hyl. It is.
Phil. Now, if you can prove that any philosopher has explained the
production of any one idea in our minds by the help of Matter, I shall for
ever acquiesce, and look on all that hath been said against it as nothing;
but, if you cannot, it is vain to urge the explication of phenomena. That a
Being endowed with knowledge and will should produce or exhibit ideas is
easily understood. But that a Being which is utterly destitute of these
faculties should be able to produce ideas, or in any sort to affect an
intelligence, this I can never understand. This I say, though we had some
positive conception of Matter, though we knew its qualities, and could
comprehend its existence, would yet be so far from explaining things, that it
is itself the most inexplicable thing in the world. And yet, for all this, it
will not follow that philosophers have been doing nothing; for, by observing
and reasoning upon the connexion of ideas, they discover the laws and methods
of nature, which is a part of knowledge both useful and entertaining.
Hyl. After all, can it be supposed God would deceive all mankind? Do you
imagine He would have induced the whole world to believe the being of Matter,
if there was no such thing?
Phil. That every epidemical opinion, arising from prejudice, or passion,
or thoughtlessness, may be imputed to God, as the Author of it, I believe you
will not affirm. Whatsoever opinion we father on Him, it must be either
because He has discovered it to us by super-natural revelation; or because it
is so evident to our natural faculties, which were framed and given us by
God, that it is impossible we should withhold our assent from it. But where
is the revelation? or where is the evidence that extorts the belief of
Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter, taken for something distinct
from what we perceive by our senses, is thought to exist by all mankind; or
indeed, by any except a few philosophers, who do not know what they would be
at? Your question supposes these points are clear; and, when you have cleared
them, I shall think myself obliged to give you another answer. In the
meantime, let it suffice that I tell you, I do not suppose God has deceived
mankind at all.
Hyl. But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty! There lies the danger. New
notions should always be discountenanced; they unsettle men`s minds, and
nobody knows where they will end.
Phil. Why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation, either in sense,
or in reason, or in Divine authority, should be thought to unsettle the belief
of such opinions as are grounded on all or any of these, I cannot imagine.
That innovations in government and religion are dangerous, and ought to be
discountenanced, I freely own. But is there the like reason why they should
be discouraged in philosophy? The making anything known which was unknown
before is an innovation in knowledge: and, if all such innovations had been
forbidden, men would have made a notable progress in the arts and sciences.
But it is none of my business to plead for novelties and paradoxes. That the
qualities we perceive are not on the objects: that we must not believe our
senses: that we know nothing of the real nature of things, and can never be
assured even of their existence: that real colours and sounds are nothing but
certain unknown figures and motions: that motions are in themselves neither
swift nor slow: that there are in bodies absolute extensions, without any
particular magnitude or figure: that a thing stupid, thoughtless, and
inactive, operates on a spirit: that the least particle of a body contains
innumerable extended parts: - these are the novelties, these are the strange
notions which shock the genuine uncorrupted judgment of all mankind; and being
once admitted, embarrass the mind with endless doubts and difficulties. And it
is against these and the like innovations I endeavour to vindicate Common
Sense. It is true, in doing this, I may perhaps be obliged to use some
ambages, and ways of speech not common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly
understood, that which is most singular in them will, in effect, be found to
amount to no more than this: - that it is absolutely impossible, and a plain
contradiction, to suppose any unthinking Being should exist without being
perceived by a Mind. And, if this notion be singular, it is a shame it should
be so, at this time of day, and in a Christian country.
Hyl. As for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to, those are
out of the question. It is your business to defend your own opinion. Can
anything be plainer than that you are for changing all things into ideas? You,
I say, who are not ashamed to charge me with scepticism. This is so plain,
there is no denying it.
Phil. You mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather
ideas into things; since those immediate objects of perception, which,
according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things
Hyl. Things! You may pretend what you please; but it is certain you leave
us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside only which strikes the
Phil. What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me the
very things themselves. Nor are they empty or incomplete, otherwise than upon
your supposition - that Matter is an essential part of all corporeal things.
We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms: but
herein we differ - you will have them to be empty appearances, I, real beings.
In short, you do not trust your senses, I do.
Hyl. You say you believe your senses; and seem to applaud yourself that
in this you agree with the vulgar. According to you, therefore, the true
nature of a thing is discovered by the senses. If so, whence comes that
disagreement? Why is not the same figure, and other sensible qualities,
perceived all manner of ways? and why should we use a microscope the better to
discover the true nature of a body, if it were discoverable to the naked eye?
Phil. Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we
feel; neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which was by the
naked eye. But, in case every variation was thought sufficient to constitute a
new kind of individual, the endless number of confusion of names would render
language impracticable. Therefore, to avoid this, as well as other
inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought, men combine together
several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by the same sense at different
times, or in different circumstances, but observed, however, to have some
connexion in nature, either with respect to co-existence or succession; all
which they refer to one name, and consider as one thing. Hence it follows that
when I examine, by my other senses, a thing I have seen, it is not in order to
understand better the same object which I had perceived by sight, the object
of one sense not being perceived by the other senses. And, when I look through
a microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I perceived
already with my bare eyes; the object perceived by the glass being quite
different from the former. But, in both cases, my aim is only to know what
ideas are connected together; and the more a man knows of the connexion of
ideas, the more he is said to know of the nature of things. What, therefore,
if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are not in all circumstances
affected with the same appearances. It will not thence follow they are not to
be trusted; or that they are inconsistent either with themselves or anything
else: except it be with your preconceived notion of (I know not what) one
single, unchanged, unperceivable, real Nature, marked by each name. Which
prejudice seems to have taken its rise from not rightly understanding the
common language of men, speaking of several distinct ideas as united into one
thing by the mind. And, indeed, there is cause to suspect several erroneous
conceits of the philosophers are owing to the same original: while they began
to build their schemes not so much on notions as on words, which were framed
by the vulgar, merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common actions of
life, without any regard to speculation.
Hyl. Methinks I apprehend your meaning.
Phil. It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our senses are not real
things, but images or copies of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is no farther
real than as our ideas are the true representations of those originals. But,
as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown, it is impossible to
know how far our ideas resemble them; or whether they resemble them at all. We
cannot, therefore, be sure we have any real knowledge. Farther, as our ideas
are perpetually varied, without any change in the supposed real things, it
necessarily follows they cannot all be true copies of them: or, if some are
and others are not, it is impossible to distinguish the former from the
latter. And this plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty. Again, when we consider
the point, we cannot conceive how any idea, or anything like an idea, should
have an absolute existence out of a mind: nor consequently, according to you,
how there should be any real thing in nature. The result of all which is that
we are thrown into the most hopeless and abandoned scepticism. Now, give me
leave to ask you, First, Whether your referring ideas to certain absolutely
existing unperceived substances, as their originals, be not the source of all
this scepticism? Secondly, whether you are informed, either by sense or
reason, of the existence of those unknown originals? And, in case you are not,
whether it be not absurd to suppose them? Thirdly, Whether, upon inquiry, you
find there is anything distinctly conceived or meant by the absolute or
external existence of unperceiving substances? Lastly, Whether, the premises
considered, it be not the wisest way to follow nature, trust your senses, and,
laying aside all anxious thought about unknown natures or substances, admit
with the vulgar those for real things which are perceived by the senses?
Hyl. For the present, I have no inclination to the answering part. I
would much rather see how you can get over what follows. Pray are not the
objects perceived by the senses of one, likewise perceivable to others
present? If there were a hundred more here, they would all see the garden,
the trees, and flowers, as I see them. But they are not in the same manner
affected with the ideas I frame in my imagination. Does not this make a
difference between the former sort of objects and the latter?
Phil. I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a difference between the
objects of sense and those of imagination. But what would you infer from
thence? You cannot say that sensible objects exist unperceived, because they
are perceived by many.
Hyl. I own I can make nothing of that objection: but it hath led me into
another. Is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only the ideas
existing in our minds?
Phil. It is.
Hyl. But the same idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours, or in any
other mind. Doth it not therefore follow, from your principles, that no two
can see the same thing? And is not this highly absurd?
Phil. If the term same be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is certain
(and not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain) that different
persons may perceive the same thing; or the same thing or idea exist in
different minds. Words are of arbitrary imposition; and, since men are used
to apply the word same where no distinction or variety is perceived, and I do
not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows that, as men have said
before, several saw the same thing, so they may, upon like occasions, still
continue to use the same phrase, without any deviation either from propriety
of language, or the truth of things. But, if the term same be used in the
acceptation of philosophers, who pretend to an abstracted notion of identity,
then, according to their sundry definitions of this notion (for it is not yet
agreed wherein that philosophic identity consists), it may or may not be
possible for divers persons to perceive the same thing. But whether
philosophers shall think fit to call a thing the same or no, is, I conceive,
of small importance. Let us suppose several men together, all endued with the
same faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by their senses, and
who had yet never known the use of language; they would, without question,
agree in their perceptions. Though perhaps, when they came to the use of
speech, some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived, might call it
the same thing: others, especially regarding the diversity of persons who
perceived, might choose the denomination of different things. But who sees
not that all the dispute is about a word? to wit, whether what is perceived
by different persons may yet have the term same applied to it? Or, suppose a
house, whose walls or outward shell remaining unaltered, the chambers are all
pulled down, and new ones built in their place; and that you should call this
the same, and I should say it was not the same house: - would we not, for all
this, perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house, considered in itself? And
would not all the difference consist in a sound? If you should say, We
differed in our notions; for that you super-added to your idea of the house
the simple abstracted idea of identity, whereas I did not; I would tell you, I
know not what you mean by the abstracted idea of identity; and should desire
you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you understood yourself. - Why
so silent, Hylas? Are you not yet satisfied men may dispute about identity and
diversity, without any real difference in their thoughts and opinions,
abstracted from names? Take this farther reflexion with you - that whether
Matter be allowed to exist or no, the case is exactly the same as to the point
in hand. For the Materialists themselves acknowledge what we immediately
perceive by our senses to be our own ideas. Your difficulty, therefore, that
no two see the same thing, makes equally against the Materialists and me.
Hyl. Ay, Philonous, But they suppose an external archetype, to which
referring their several ideas they may truly be said to perceive the same
Phil. And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) so may
you suppose an external archetype on my principles; - external, I mean, to
your own mind: though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that Mind which
comprehends all things; but then, this serves all the ends of identity, as
well as if it existed out of a mind. And I am sure you yourself will not say
it is less intelligible.
Hyl. You have indeed clearly satisfied me - either that there is no
difficulty at bottom in this point; or, if there be, that it makes equally
against both opinions.
Phil. But that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions can
be a proof against neither.
Hyl. I acknowledge it.
But, after all, Philonous, when I consider the substance of what you
advance against Scepticism, it amounts to no more than this: - We are sure
that we really see, hear, feel; in a word, that we are affected with sensible
Phil. And how are we considered any farther? I see this cherry, I feel
it, I taste it: and I am sure nothing cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted: it
is therefore real. Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness,
tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is not a being distinct from
sensations. A cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible
impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses: which ideas are united into
one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind, because they are observed
to attend each other. Thus, when the palate is affected with such a particular
taste, the sight is affected with a red colour, the touch with roundness,
softness, &c. Hence, when I see, and feel, and taste, in such sundry certain
manners, I am sure the cherry exists, or is real; its reality being in my
opinion nothing abstracted from those sensations. But if by the word cherry
you mean an unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by
its existence something distinct from its being perceived; then, indeed, I
own, neither you nor I, nor any one else, can be sure it exists.
Hyl. But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the very same
reasons against the existence of sensible things in a mind, which you have
offered against their existing in a material substratum?
Phil. When I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to say to them.
Hyl. Is the mind extended or unextended?
Phil. Unextended, without doubt.
Hyl. Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind?
Phil. They are.
Hyl. Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible impressions?
Phil. I believe you may.
Hyl. Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is possible there should be
room for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind. Can extended things
be contained in that which is unextended? Or, are we to imagine impressions
made on a thing void of all solidity? You cannot say objects are in your mind,
as books in your study: or that things are imprinted on it, as the figure of
a seal upon wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to understand those
expressions? Explain me this if you can: and I shall then be able to answer
all those queries you formerly put to me about my substratum.