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Third DialoguePart III
Part III
Phil. Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind,
or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross literal
sense; as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an
impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives
them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being distinct from
itself. This is my explication of your difficulty; and how it can serve to
make your tenet of an unperceiving material substratum intelligible, I would
fain know.
Hyl. Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be made of
it. But are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this?
Phil. None at all. It is no more than common custom, which you know is
the rule of language, hath authorised: nothing being more usual, than for
philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the understanding as things
existing in the mind. Nor is there anything in this but what is conformable to
the general analogy of language; most part of the mental operations being
signified by words borrowed from sensible things; as is plain in the terms
comprehend, reflect, discourse, &c., which, being applied to the mind, must
not be taken in their gross, original sense.
Hyl. You have, I own, satisfied me in this point. But there still remains
one great difficulty, which I know not how you will get over. And, indeed, it
is of such importance that if you could solve all others, without being able
to find a solution for this, you must never expect to make me a proselyte to
your principles.
Phil. Let me know this mighty difficulty.
Hyl. The Scripture account of the creation is what appears to me utterly
irreconcilable with your notions. Moses tells us of a creation: a creation of
what? of ideas? No, certainly, but of things, of real things, solid corporeal
substances. Bring your principles to agree with this, and I shall perhaps
agree with you.
Phil. Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth and sea, plants
and animals. That all these do really exist, and were in the beginning
created by God, I make no question. If by ideas you mean fictions and fancies
of the mind, then these are no ideas. If by ideas you mean immediate objects
of the understanding, or sensible things, which cannot exist unperceived, or
out of a mind, then these things are ideas. But whether you do or do not call
them ideas, it matters little. The difference is only about a name. And,
whether that name be retained or rejected, the sense, the truth, and reality
of things continues the same. In common talk, the objects of our senses are
not termed ideas, but things. Call them so still: provided you do not
attribute to them any absolute external existence, and I shall never quarrel
with you for a word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a creation
of things, of real things. Neither is this in the least inconsistent with my
principles, as is evident from what I have now said; and would have been
evident to you without this, if you had not forgotten what had been so often
said before. But as for solid corporeal substances, I desire you to show
where Moses makes any mention of them; and, if they should be mentioned by
him, or any other inspired writer, it would still be incumbent on you to shew
those words were not taken in the vulgar acceptation, for things falling
under our senses, but in the philosophic acceptation, for Matter, or an
unknown quiddity, with an absolute existence. When you have proved these
points, then (and not till then) may you bring the authority of Moses into
our dispute.
Hyl. It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear. I am content to
refer it to your own conscience. Are you not satisfied there is some peculiar
repugnancy between the Mosaic account of the creation and your notions?
Phil. If all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter of
Genesis may be conceived as consistently with my principles as any other,
then it has no peculiar repugnancy with them. But there is no sense you may
not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, besides spirits, all you
conceive are ideas; and the existence of these I do not deny. Neither do you
pretend they exist without the mind.
Hyl. Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in.
Phil. Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I should
have seen things produced into being - that is become perceptible - in the
order prescribed by the sacred historian. I never before believed the Mosaic
account of the creation, and now find no alteration in my manner of believing
it. When things are said to begin or end their existence, we do not mean this
with regard to God, but His creatures. All objects are eternally known by God,
or, which is the same thing, have an eternal existence in His mind: but when
things, before imperceptible to creatures, are, by a decree of God,
perceptible to them, then are they said to begin a relative existence, with
respect to created minds. Upon reading therefore the Mosaic account of the
creation, I understand that the several parts of the world became gradually
perceivable to finite spirits, endowed with proper faculties; so that, whoever
such were present, they were in truth perceived by them. This is the literal
obvious sense suggested to me by the words of the Holy Scripture: in which is
included no mention, or no thought, either of substratum, instrument,
occasion, or absolute existence. And, upon inquiry, I doubt not it will be
found that most plain honest men, who believe the creation, never think of
those things any more than I. What metaphysical sense you may understand it
in, you only can tell.
Hyl. But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that you allow created
things, in the beginning, only a relative, and consequently hypothetical
being: that is to say, upon supposition there were men to perceive them;
without which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein creation
might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly impossible
the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of man? And is not
this directly contrary to the Mosaic account?
Phil. In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin to
exist in the mind of other created intelligences, beside men. You will not
therefore be able to prove any contradiction between Moses and my notions,
unless you first shew there was no other order of finite created spirits in
being, before man. I say farther, in case we conceive the creation, as we
should at this time, a parcel of plants or vegetables of all sorts produced,
by an invisible Power, in a desert where nobody was present - that this way of
explaining or conceiving it is consistent with my principles, since they
deprive you of nothing, either sensible or imaginable; that it exactly suits
with the common, natural, and undebauched notions of mankind; that it
manifests the dependence of all things on God; and consequently hath all the
good effect or influence, which it is possible that important article of our
faith should have in making men humble, thankful, and resigned to their
[great^4] Creator. I say, moreover, that, in this naked conception of things,
divested of words, there will not be found any notion of what you call the
actuality of absolute existence. You may indeed raise a dust with those terms,
and so lengthen our dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you calmly to look
into your own thoughts, and then tell me if they are not a useless and
unintelligible jargon.
[Footnote 4: In the first and second editions only.]
Hyl. I own I have no very clear notion annexed to them. But what say you
to this? Do you not make the existence of sensible things consist in their
being in a mind? And were not all things eternally in the mind of God? Did
they not therefore exist from all eternity, according to you? And how could
that which was eternal be created in time? Can anything be clearer or better
connected than this?
Phil. And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all things from
eternity?
Hyl. I am.
Phil. Consequently they always had a being in the Divine intellect.
Hyl. This I acknowledge/
Phil. By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new, or begins to be,
in respect of the mind of God. So we are agreed in that point.
Hyl. What shall we make then of the creation?
Phil. May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of finite
spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said to begin
their existence, or be created, when God decreed they should become
perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner which He
then established, and we now call the laws of nature? You may call this a
relative, or hypothetical existence if you please. But, so long as it supplies
us with the most natural, obvious, and literal sense of the Mosaic history
of the creation; so long as it answers all the religious ends of that great
article; in a word, so long as you can assign no other sense or meaning in its
stead; why should we reject this? Is it to comply with a ridiculous sceptical
humour of making everything nonsense and unintelligible? I am sure you cannot
say it is for the glory of God. For, allowing it to be a thing possible and
conceivable that the corporeal world should have an absolute existence
extrinsical to the mind of God, as well as to the minds of all created
spirits; yet how could this set forth either the immensity or omniscience of
the Deity, or the necessary and immediate dependence of all things on Him?
Nay, would it not rather seem to derogate from those attributes?
Hyl. Well, but as to this decree of God`s, for making things
perceptible, what say you, Philonous? Is it not plain, God did either execute
that decree from all eternity, or at some certain time began to will what He
had not actually willed before, but only designed to will? If the former, then
there could be no creation, or beginning of existence, in finite things. If
the latter, then we must acknowledge something new to befall the Deity; which
implies a sort of change: and all change argues imperfection.
Phil. Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident this objection
concludes equally against a creation in any sense; nay, against every other
act of the Deity, discoverable by the light of nature? None of which can we
conceive, otherwise than as performed in time, and having a beginning. God is
a Being of transcendent and unlimited perfections: His nature, therefore, is
incomprehensible to finite spirits. It is not, therefore, to be expected, that
any man, whether Materialist or Immaterialist, should have exactly just
notions of the Deity, His attributes, and ways of operation. If then you
would infer anything against me, your difficulty must not be drawn from the
inadequateness of our conceptions of the Divine nature, which is unavoidable
on any scheme; but from the denial of Matter, of which there is not one word,
directly or indirectly, in what you have now objected.
Hyl. I must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned to clear are
such only as arise from the non-existence of Matter, and are peculiar to that
notion. So far you are in the right. But I cannot by any means bring myself
to think there is no such peculiar repugnancy between the creation and your
opinion; though indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctly know.
Phil. What would you have? Do I not acknowledge a twofold state of
things - the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal? The
former was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the mind
of God. Is not this agreeable to the common notions of divines? or, is any
more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation? But you suspect
some peculiar repugnancy, though you know not where it lies. To take away
all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider this one point.
Either you are not able to conceive the creation on any hypothesis
whatsoever; and, if so, there is no ground for dislike or complaint against
any particular opinion on that score: or you are able to conceive it; and, if
so, why not on my Principles, since thereby nothing conceivable is taken
away? You have all along been allowed the full scope of sense, imagination,
and reason. Whatever, therefore, you could before apprehend, either
immediately or mediately by your senses, or by ratiocination from your
senses; whatever you could perceive, imagine, or understand, remains still
with you. If, therefore, the notion you have of the creation by other
Principles be intelligible, you have it still upon mine; if it be not
intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion at all; and so there is no loss
of it. And indeed it seems to me very plain that the supposition of Matter,
that is a thing perfectly unknown and inconceivable, cannot serve to make us
conceive anything. And, I hope it need not be proved to you that if the
existence of Matter doth not make the creation conceivable, the creation`s
being without it inconceivable can be no objection against its non-existence.
Hyl. I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this point of
the creation.
Phil. I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied. You tell me
indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and Immaterialism: but you
know not where it lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect I should
solve a difficulty without knowing what it is? But, to pass by all that, would
not a man think you were assured there is no repugnancy between the received
notions of Materialists and the inspired writings?
Hyl. And so I am.
Phil. Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a plain
obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the way?
Hyl. In the plain sense, doubtless.
Phil. When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having been
created by God; think you not the sensible things commonly signified by those
words are suggested to every unphilosophical reader?
Hyl. I cannot help thinking so.
Phil. And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be denied a
real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist?
Hyl. This I have already acknowledged.
Phil. The creation, therefore, according to them, was not the creation of
things sensible, which have only a relative being, but of certain unknown
natures, which have an absolute being, wherein creation might terminate?
Hyl. True.
Phil. Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter destroy the
plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their notions are utterly
inconsistent; and instead of it obtrude on us I know not what; something
equally unintelligible to themselves and me?
Hyl. I cannot contradict you.
Phil. Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? of unknown
quiddities, of occasions, or substratum? No, certainly; but of things obvious
to the senses. You must first reconcile this with your notions, if you expect
I should be reconciled to them.
Hyl. I see you can assault me with my own weapons.
Phil. Then as to absolute existence; was there ever known a more jejune
notion than that? Something it is so abstracted and unintelligible that you
have frankly owned you could not conceive it, much less explain anything by
it. But allowing Matter to exist, and the notion of absolute existence to be
clear as light; yet, was this ever known to make the creation more credible?
Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and infidels of all ages with the most
plausible arguments against a creation? That a corporeal substance, which hath
an absolute existence without the minds of spirits, should be produced out of
nothing, by the mere will of a Spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing so
contrary to all reason, so impossible and absurd, that not only the most
celebrated among the ancients, but even divers modern and Christian
philosophers have thought Matter co-eternal with the Deity. Lay these things
together, and then judge you whether Materialism disposes men to believe the
creation of things.
Hyl. I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the creation is the
last objection I can think of; and I must needs own it hath been sufficiently
answered as well as the rest. Nothing now remains to be overcome but a sort of
unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself towards your notions.
Phil. When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of the
question, can this, think you, be anything else but the effect of prejudice,
which never fails to attend old and rooted notions? And indeed in this respect
I cannot deny the belief of Matter to have very much the advantage over the
contrary opinion, with men of a learned education.
Hyl. I confess it seems to be as you say.
Phil. As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us throw
into the scale the great advantages that arise from the belief of
Immaterialism, both in regard to religion and human learning. The being of a
God, and incorruptibility of the soul, those great articles of religion, are
they not proved with the clearest and most immediate evidence? When I say the
being of a God, I do not mean an obscure general Cause of things, whereof we
have no conception, but God, in the strict and proper sense of the word. A
Being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence, omniscience, infinite
power and goodness, are as conspicuous as the existence of sensible things, of
which (notwithstanding the fallacious pretences and affected scruples of
Sceptics) there is no more reason to doubt than of our own being. - Then, with
relation to human sciences. In Natural Philosophy, what intricacies, what
obscurities, what contradictions hath the belief of Matter led men into! To
say nothing of the numberless disputes about its extent, continuity,
homogeneity, gravity, divisibility, &c. - do they not pretend to explain all
things by bodies operating on bodies, according to the laws of motion? and
yet, are they able to comprehend how one body should move another? Nay,
admitting there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an inert being
with a cause, or in conceiving how an accident might pass from one body to
another; yet, by all their strained thoughts and extravagant suppositions,
have they been able to reach the mechanical production of any one animal or
vegetable body? Can they account, by the laws of motion, for sounds, tastes,
smells, or colours; or for the regular course of things? Have they accounted,
by physical principles, for the aptitude and contrivance even of the most
inconsiderable parts of the universe? But, laying aside Matter and corporeal
causes, and admitting only the efficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not all
the effects of nature easy and intelligible? If the phenomena are nothing else
but ideas; God is a spirit, but Matter an unintelligent, unperceiving being.
If they demonstrate an unlimited power in their cause; God is active and
omnipotent, but Matter an inert mass. If the order, regularity, and usefulness
of them can never be sufficiently admired; God is infinitely wise and
provident, but Matter destitute of all contrivance and design. These surely
are great advantages in Physics. Not to mention that the apprehension of a
distant Deity naturally disposes men to a negligence in their moral actions;
which they would be more cautious of, in case they thought Him immediately
present, and acting on their minds, without the interposition of Matter, or
unthinking second causes. - Then in Metaphysics: what difficulties concerning
entity in abstract, substantial forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures,
substance and accident, principle of individuation, possibility of Matter`s
thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how two independent substances so widely
different as Spirit and Matter, should mutually operate on each other? what
difficulties, I say, and endless disquisitions, concerning these and
innumerable other the like points, do we escape, by supposing only Spirits and
ideas? - Even the Mathematics themselves, if we take away the absolute
existence of extended things, become much more clear and easy; the most
shocking paradoxes and intricate speculations in those sciences depending on
the infinite divisibility of finite extension; which depends on that
supposition But what need is there to insist on the particular sciences? Is
not that opposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and
modern Sceptics, built on the same foundation? Or can you produce so much as
one argument against the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of that
avowed utter ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose their reality
to consist in an external absolute existence? Upon this supposition, indeed,
the objections from the change of colours in a pigeon`s neck, or the
appearance of the broken oar in the water, must be allowed to have weight. But
these and the like objections vanish, if we do not maintain the being of
absolute external originals, but place the reality of things in ideas,
fleeting indeed, and changeable; - however, not changed at random, but
according to the fixed order of nature. For, herein consists that constancy
and truth of things which secures all the concerns of life, and distinguishes
that which is real from the irregular visions of the fancy.
Hyl. I agree to all you have now said, and must own that nothing can
incline me to embrace your opinion more than the advantages I see it is
attended with. I am by nature lazy; and this would be a mighty abridgment in
knowledge. What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusement, what
fields of disputation, what an ocean of false learning, may be avoided by that
single notion of Immaterialism!
Phil. After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done? You may
remember you promised to embrace that opinion which upon examination should
appear most agreeable to Common Sense and remote from Scepticism. This, by
your own confession, is that which denies Matter, or the absolute existence
of corporeal things. Nor is this all; the same notion has been proved several
ways, viewed in different lights, pursued in its consequences, and all
objections against it cleared. Can there be a greater evidence of its truth?
or is it possible it should have all the marks of a true opinion and yet be
false?
Hyl. I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects.
But, what security can I have that I shall still continue the same full assent
to your opinion, and that no unthought - of objection or difficulty will occur
hereafter?
Phil. Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point is once evidently
proved, withhold your consent on account of objections or difficulties it may
be liable to? Are the difficulties that attend the doctrine of incommensurable
quantities, of the angle of contact, of the asymptotes to curves, or the like,
sufficient to make you hold out against mathematical demonstration? Or will
you disbelieve the Providence of God, because there may be some particular
things which you know not how to reconcile with it? If there are difficulties
attending Immaterialism, there are at the same time direct and evident proofs
of it. But for the existence of Matter there is not one proof, and far more
numerous and insurmountable objections lie against it. But where are those
mighty difficulties you insist on? Alas! you know not where or what they are;
something which may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a sufficient
pretence for withholding your full assent, you should never yield it to any
proposition, how free soever from exceptions, how clearly and solidly soever
demonstrated.
Hyl. You have satisfied me, Philonous.
Phil. But, to arm you against all future objections, do but consider:
That which bears equally hard on two contradictory opinions can be proof
against neither. Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try if you can
find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the Materialists. Be not
deceived by words; but sound your own thoughts. And in case you cannot
conceive it easier by the help of Materialism, it is plain it can be no
objection against Immaterialism. Had you proceeded all along by this rule,
you would probably have spared yourself abundance of trouble in objecting;
since of all your difficulties I challenge you to shew one that is explained
by Matter: nay, which is not more unintelligible with than without that
supposition; and consequently makes rather against than for it. You should
consider, in each particular, whether the difficulty arises from the
non-existence of Matter. If it doth not, you might as well argue from the
infinite divisibility of extension against the Divine prescience, as from
such a difficulty against Immaterialism. And yet, upon recollection, I
believe you will find this to have been often, if not always, the case. You
should likewise take heed not to argue on a petitio principii. One is apt to
say - The unknown substances ought to be esteemed real things, rather than the
ideas in our minds: and who can tell but the unthinking external substance may
concur, as a cause or instrument, in the productions of our ideas? But is not
this proceeding on a supposition that there are such external substances? And
to suppose this, is it not begging the question? But, above all things, you
should beware of imposing on yourself by that vulgar sophism which is called
ignoratio elenchi. You talked often as if you thought I maintained the
non-existence of Sensible Things. Whereas in truth no one can be more
thoroughly assured of their existence than I am. And it is you who doubt; I
should have said, positively deny it. Everything that is seen, felt, heard,
or any way perceived by the senses, is, on the principles I embrace, a real
being; but not on yours. Remember, the Matter you contend for is an Unknown
Somewhat (if indeed it may be termed somewhat), which is quite stripped of all
sensible qualities, and can neither be perceived by sense, nor apprehended by
the mind. Remember I say, that it is not any object which is hard or soft, hot
or cold, blue or white, round or square, &c. For all these things I affirm do
exist. Though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct from being
perceived; or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever. Think on these
points; let them be attentively considered and still kept in view. Otherwise
you will not comprehend the state of the question; without which your
objections will always be wide of the mark, and, instead of mine, may possibly
be directed (as more than once they have been) against your own notions.
Hyl. I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from
agreeing with you more than this same mistaking the question. In denying
Matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we
see and feel: but, upon reflexion, find there is no ground for it. What think
you, therefore, of retaining the name Matter, and applying it to sensible
things? This may be done without any change in your sentiments: and, believe
me, it would be a means of reconciling them to some persons who may be more
shocked at an innovation in words than in opinion.
Phil. With all my heart: retain the word Matter, and apply it to the
objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any
subsistence distinct from their being perceived. I shall never quarrel with
you for an expression. Matter, or material substance, are terms introduced by
philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort of independency, or a
subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind: but are never used by
common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects of sense.
One would think, therefore,so long as the names of all particular things, with
the terms sensible, substance, body, stuff, and the like, are retained, the
word Matter should be never missed in common talk. And in philosophical
discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite out: since there is not,
perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved
bent of the mind towards Atheism than the use of that general confused term.
Hyl. Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the notion of an
unthinking substance exterior to the mind, I think you ought not to deny me
the privilege of using the word Matter as I please, and annexing it to a
collection of sensible qualities subsisting only in the mind. I freely own
there is no other substance, in a strict sense, than Spirit. But I have been
so long accustomed to the term Matter that I know not how to part with it:
to say, there is no Matter in the world, is still shocking to me. Whereas to
say - There is no Matter, if by that term be meant an unthinking substance
existing without the mind; but if by Matter is meant some sensible thing,
whose existence consists in being perceived, then there is Matter: - this
distinction gives it quite another turn; and men will come into your notions
with small difficulty, when they are proposed in that manner. For, after all,
the controversy about Matter in the strict acceptation of it, lies altogether
between you and the philosophers: whose principles, I acknowledge, are not
near so natural, or so agreeable to the common sense of mankind, and Holy
Scripture, as yours. There is nothing we either desire or shun but as it
makes, or is apprehended to make, some part of our happiness or misery. But
what hath happiness or misery, joy or grief, pleasure or pain, to do with
Absolute Existence; or with unknown entities, abstracted from all relation to
us? It is evident, things regard us only as they are pleasing or displeasing:
and they can please or displease only so far forth as they are perceived.
Farther, therefore, we are not concerned; and thus far you leave things as you
found them. Yet still there is something new in this doctrine. It is plain, I
do not now think with the Philosophers; nor yet altogether with the vulgar. I
would know how the case stands in that respect; precisely, what you have
added to, or altered in my former notions.
Phil. I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My endeavours
tend only to unite, and place in a clearer light, that truth which was
before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers: - the former being
of opinion, that those things they immediately perceive are the real things;
and the latter, that the things immediately perceived are ideas, which exist
only in the mind. Which two notions put together, do, in effect, constitute
the substance of what I advance.
Hyl. I have been a long time distrusting my senses: methought I saw
things by a dim light and through false glasses. Now the glasses are removed
and a new light breaks in upon my understanding. I am clearly convinced that
I see things in their native forms, and am no longer in pain about their
unknown natures or absolute existence. This is the state I find myself in at
present; though, indeed, the course that brought me to it I do not yet
thoroughly comprehend. You set out upon the same principles that Academics,
Cartesians, and the like sects usually do; and for a long time it looked as
if you were advancing their philosophical Scepticism: but, in the end, your
conclusions are directly opposite to theirs.
Phil. You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced
upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which it breaks, and
falls back into the basin from whence it rose: its ascent, as well as descent,
proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of gravitation. Just so,
the same Principles which, at first view, lead to Scepticism, pursued to a
certain point, bring men back to Common Sense.
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